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On 9 July 1819, Julian Acosta faced trial. Acosta, a militiaman in the fourth company of
the Battalion of Pardos of Havana, stood accused of repeated desertion: on the fifth of
that month, he had abandoned his company’s post in St. Augustine, the capital of Spanish
East Florida.1 Acosta, the court maintained, had also tried to flee military service on 1 Oc-
tober of the previous year, while still stationed in Cuba. His more recent desertion was
undeniable –he had been caught twenty-two miles from the fort only three days before his
trial began. Realizing, perhaps, that evasion would avail him little, Acosta offered his mo-
tives in lieu of a defense. He complained that he had been «shamed and abused» by a Ser-
geant Mauricio Gomes, and that he «lacked clothes». As for the earlier desertion charge,
Acosta suggested the possibility of a bureaucratic error, and argued that he could not pos-
sibly have deserted in Cuba on the alleged date, as he was en route to Pensacola then, and
was later a prisoner in American New Orleans, claims that were quickly proven false.2 But
incredibly, the militiaman was not convicted; indeed, it appears no verdict was ever pro-
nounced. Citing a lack of soldiers capable of fulfilling Acosta’s duties, East Florida Go-
vernor José Coppinger (1817-1821) ordered the lucky deserter freed.3 Prior to his deser-
tion, Acosta had been nothing more than a common soldier. He was effectively pardoned,
then, because St. Augustine lacked enough troops to guard it.
Acosta’s offense, as well as the troop shortage that saved him, far from being mere
historical phenomena, are rather the tip of a very large and hitherto ignored iceberg.
East Florida’s manpower shortage, Acosta’s unlikely savior, has been documented, but
historians have not analyzed or even quantified it in any great detail. Acosta’s desertion
and the many others like it in Spanish East Florida have similarly been little studied by
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1. Several Spanish racial euphemisms pervade this study. In the interests of clarity, they should be defi-
ned before proceeding any further. Pardos like Julian Acosta were individuals of mixed white and black heri-
tage, or mulattos. A moreno was a free individual of exclusively African descent. Finally, a casta was any indi-
vidual of even partial non-white heritage, including both of the above categories as well as mestizos, mixed
Amerindian-Europeans.
2. Testimony for Trial of Julian Acosta, Records of Court-Martials, 1785-1821, section 64, microfilm reel
120, East Florida Papers (hereafter cited as EFP), P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Flori-
da, Gainesville, Fl. (hereafter cited as PKY).
3. Trial of Julian Acosta, Records of Courts-Martial, 1785-1821, section 64, reel 120, EFP, PKY.
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scholars. And most of all, Acosta’s unit –the Cuban Negro Militia– has been virtually ig-
nored by the historical community.4 These lacunae, though seemingly minor, are by no
means so –the narratives they conceal are pregnant with consequences for our unders-
tanding of the years and circumstances surrounding Spain’s still– controversial loss of its
North American colony.
Acosta’s desertion was, firstly, not unique: records abound of other similar instances
of flight from the Cuban Negro Militia detachment posted in Spanish Florida between
1812 and 1821. Throughout this period, officials including St. John’s River commander
Tomás Llorente and East Florida Governor Sebastián Kindelán (1812-1815) criticized
the militia in their correspondence, calling its members cowardly and unreliable, and be-
moaned the militia’s surfeit of desertions.
And yet, only a few scholars, however, have engaged with the militia’s tenure in Flo-
rida; for the most part, the East Florida detachment of Cuba’s black militia itself, as well
as its parent troop, have been virtually ignored by the scholarly community. What little
work exists has either offered only a topical history of the troop focused on the militia as
a whole rather than its Floridian contingent, has included little actual detail on the wor-
kings of the Cuban militia and the lives of its soldiers, or has covered a much later and
very different period of the Cuban militia’s existence.5 Herbert S. Klein’s «The Coloured
Militia of Cuba» (1966), for example, one of only two articles in existence devoted ex-
clusively to the militia, provides a general outline of the 300 year history of the Cuban
Negro Militia, but, at 10 pages in length, necessarily offers little depth of analysis.6 And
historian Matt Childs has recently produced the sole monograph focused largely on the
militia, an analysis of the Aponte Rebellion of 1812, in which militiamen were centrally
involved.7 But, these few exceptions aside, the Cuban troop’s history remains unexplo-
red, especially with regard to the militia’s tenure in East Florida and the alleged deser-
tions it experienced there.
Those few scholars who have delved into this question, moreover, have uncritically
accepted the verdicts of Llorente and Kindelán, citing these officials’ opinions but not,
significantly, any desertion cases.8 No actual tally of desertions attributable to East Flo-
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4. Readers may wonder why I have chosen this phrase as my primary term for the Cuban militia. A con-
venient and accurate shorthand, I have borrowed it from the East Florida Papers collection’s card catalog en-
tries at the University of Florida’s P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History.
5. See, for example, Juan Marchena Fernández, «Guarniciones y población militar en Florida Oriental
(1700-1820),» Revista de Indias (1981): 91-142; David Sartorius, «My Vassals: Free-Colored Militias in Cuba
and the Ends of Spanish Empire,» Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History 5:2, (Winter, 2004); and Allan
Kuethe, Cuba, 1753-1815: Crown, Military and Society, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).
6. Herbert S. Klein, «The Coloured Militia of Cuba,» Caribbean Studies 6 (1966): 17-27.
7. Matt Childs, The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery, (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
8. Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1999); James
Robertson Ward, Old Hickory’s Town: An Illustrated History of Jacksonville (Jacksonville: Old Hickory’s
Town, Inc., 1985); In Black Society in Spanish Florida, Landers seemingly dismisses the Cuban Negro Militia,
noting Governor Kindelán’s disdain for them as cowardly and undisciplined «convicts», presenting Georgian
outrage as their primary consequence and thereafter narrating Kindelán’s use of the urban, local militia –al-
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rida’s black Cuban militiamen –and vociferously condemned by East Floridian com-
manders– or indeed Cuban pardo and moreno militia as a whole, has ever been quanti-
fied. Desertion, meanwhile, was a common feature of militias and even regular army re-
giments, both in the late colonial Spanish Caribbean and in Spain itself. Long accepted
as a historical commonplace, then, the Cuban militia’s reputation as a particularly unre-
liable corps remains unsubstantiated, and, as a consequence, there emerges a real possi-
bility that the militia has been shortchanged historically.
This is especially unfortunate, for the story of the Cuban militia’s service in East Flo-
rida contains important insights into the circumstances surrounding the colony’s loss.
Since Governor José Coppinger surrendered St. Augustine to representatives of the Uni-
ted States government on 10 July 1821, historians of colonial Florida have attempted to
determine the underlying causes of the turnover.9 These scholars have arrived at two
competing theories for the loss, a tacit consensus of sorts.10 One theory focuses on the
power of money: Pablo Tornero and L. David Norris both argue that the 1821 handover
was principally the consequence of the St. Augustine government’s financial troubles.
The other theory, championed by Rembert Patrick, lays the blame for East Florida’s loss
on the Spanish colony’s inability to defend itself against General Andrew Jackson’s re-
peated impositions on Spanish territorial sovereignty, convincing both the Spanish
Crown and his own government that Spain’s continued hold on the colony had become
untenable.».11 Finally, there exists a third approach that combines these two theories.
Herbert Fuller proposes first that the Florida annexation was contracted to settle debts
that President James Monroe’s government claimed Spain owed to the United States. He
then argues that ultimately, military might was the deciding factor for, «nothing of the
kind would have been conceived or attempted if Spain had been able to defend by for-
ce her unquestionable rights».12
At first glance, militia records –in fact, Acosta’s trial record– appear to corroborate
Patrick’s version. In the effective pardon he issued Acosta, Governor Coppinger cited a
troop shortage in East Florida, though he did not use this term; this shortage can only
have hindered the colony’s attempts to defend itself against attacks like General Andrew
Jackson’s 1818 seizure of the strongholds of St. Marks and Pensacola. Moreover, Acos-
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most as if arguing for the relevance of the latter over the former. The remainder of her chapter bears this out,
as the emphasis there is on local black militias, including Jorge Jacobo’s corps and Jorge Biassou’s Black Au-
xiliaries of Charles IV. Meanwhile, in Old Hickory’s Town Ward quotes Tomás Llorente, saying much the same,
without offering any form of qualification to the latter’s statements.
9. L. David Norris, «José Coppinger in East Florida, 1816-1821: A Man, A Province, and a Spanish Co-
lonial Failure» (Ph.D. diss., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1981), 359, 4.
10. Pablo Tornero Tinajero, Relaciones de dependencia entre Florida y Estados Unidos (1783-1820), (Ma-
drid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, 1979); Paul Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, (Bloomington and Indiana-
polis: Indiana University Press, 2002); Rembert Patrick and Allen Morris, Florida Under Five Flags, 4th ed.
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967); and Herbert B. Fuller, The Purchase of Florida: Its History and
Diplomacy, (Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 1906).
11. Patrick and Morris, 28-29.
12. Fuller, 327.
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ta’s crime, if as common as Llorente and Kindelán’s testimony suggests, serves to explain
manpower shortages like the one that ironically rescued the militia deserter.
Further examination of the correspondence exchanged between the East Florida go-
vernor and his army commanders, however, reveals that Cuban Negro Militia deserters did
not flee capriciously, but rather due to myriad grievances including a high incidence of
hospitalization, a pronounced lack of food, uniforms and pay, and clear indication from
their superiors that theirs was a losing battle for a province that Spain was soon going to
give up anyway. These militiamen were not flighty criminals; something, rather, was amiss
in East Florida. Indeed, a simple dismissal of the militia’s deserters as criminals fails to ac-
count for the fact that Llorente and Kindelán praised these soldiers as often as they malig-
ned them, and that its parent troop in Cuba enjoyed remarkable prestige, regularly sending
soldiers into the officer ranks.13 These shortages as well as their symptom must also be
numbered among the dysfunctions that precipitated the loss of Spanish Florida.
So too must the causes of these shortages be added. There was a reason for East Flo-
rida’s garrison –money, or rather a lack thereof. In his 1981 doctoral dissertation, Norris
maintains that the colonial government in St. Augustine constantly operated on the ver-
ge of bankruptcy during the last decades of Spanish rule. In fact, in the end, Norris sta-
tes, Coppinger himself donated 3,000 pesos of his own money to keep his government
afloat.14 Records from the St. Augustine Royal Treasury confirm Norris’ argument, des-
cribing a sudden, severe crash in the colony’s finances in 1811, during which the trea-
sury’s monthly overhead dropped by a whole order of magnitude.
These intertwined manpower, logistical and financial crises combined to form a vi-
cious downward spiral of fortunes for the Spanish colony of East Florida. Troop losses
permitted armed units from across the border to raid without consequences, disrupting
trade and agriculture. As the province’s financial circumstances consequently declined,
so did the provincial government’s ability to purchase supplies and, as a result, to retain
troops, whose loss moreover shrank the size of the situado, the vital subsidy that St. Au-
gustine used to pay its military and other expenses.15
Compounding these already severe crises, widespread poor governing also damaged
the colony. In particular, a policy of lenience toward deserters throughout the early ni-
neteenth century fostered further flight from military service. Undergirding the fiscal co-
llapse was a shoddy colonial economic system that left Florida at the mercy of the richer
colonies of New Spain and Cuba, both of whom preserved themselves in comparatively
better financial straits at the expense of Spain’s cash –and goods-starved North Ameri-
can colony. Lastly, fault for the Cuban militia’s misfortune, and East Florida’s collapse,
must also be placed at the feet of a series of events that were entirely outside the control
of colonial officials, such as Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Spain, an event
that affected Florida’s economy severely.
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13. Childs, 82-83 and Klein, 17-27.
14. Norris.
15. See note 73.
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In sum, the story of East Florida’s CNM garrison is due a more considered look. The
question of the Cuban militia’s legacy as unreliable remains unresolved –a quantitative,
comparative analysis of the militia’s real rather than reputed desertions may damn the
detachment, but will do so with its deeds, not the hyperbolic and occasionally racist
rants of Floridian officials. And, conversely, it may prove that the grievances motivating
these desertions were severe enough to justify and vindicate men like Julian Acosta. The
case of East Florida’s black Cuban militia detachment similarly raises doubts about
whether militia enlistment was by the early nineteenth century still the bargain enlistees
once thought it. In Spanish colonial class society, the militia had existed as the primary
avenue for the social and material advancement of the Afro-Cuban, who otherwise oc-
cupied the lowest rung of the social ladder.16 In light of the challenges black militiamen
faced, and the disillusion, disobedience, and on occasion desertion with which they res-
ponded, the militia may very well have instead been for them a devil’s bargain. And this,
if so, in turn calls into question whether social mobility was at this time a reasonable pos-
sibility at all. And, finally, consideration of the harsh conditions these men fled offers a
multiplex, more satisfying explanation for why the colony fell than the mostly unicausal
ones offered to date.
A Bicentennial History of Service…at a Price
Between 1812 and 1813, 270 moreno and pardo militiamen arrived in St. Augustine, se-
asoned soldiers who were members of a troop that boasted a bicentennial tradition of
exemplary service. They were not, however, men necessarily motivated by altruism nor
patriotism. Rather, they were essentially mercenaries, men who had enlisted seeking bet-
ter lives for themselves.
Cuba’s black militia had been founded more than two hundred years before, in
1586. Like its counterparts in the Spanish colonies of New Spain (present-day Mexico),
New Granada (present day Colombia, Panamá, and Venezuela), Louisiana, and, for that
matter, Florida, the Cuban militia was founded to protect the coastal regions of the co-
lony from foreign invasion. Cuba was a particularly enticing prize to Great Britain,
France and other participants in Caribbean-European trade, as the island’s geographic
position allowed it to exert control over trade in the region, rendering it a veritable «ga-
teway to the Caribbean».17
While at first, in 1586, blacks had simply been members of a general militia esta-
blished by the Governor of Cuba in response to threat of English attack, by the sevente-
enth century they had their own company, the Compañia de Pardos Libres. Like many of
the aforementioned other black militias formed in the Spanish colonies, this militia com-
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16. Allan Kuethe, «The Status of the Free Pardo in the Disciplined Militia of New Granada», The Jour-
nal of Negro History 56:2 (Apr. 1971), 108.
17. Klein, 17.
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pany was organized less as a voluntary civilian group than a professional military body.
Members were entitled to uniforms, drilled regularly, were often employed on guard
duty, met both corsairs and regular European troops in battle, and were subject to seve-
re military discipline. After the British capture of Havana in 1762, and Spain’s subse-
quent surrender of East and West Florida in exchange for its return, this movement to-
ward professionalism only increased.18
And yet, the militia was an increasingly popular option throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. This increased focus on military discipline might have offered
a disincentive for the potential militia enlistee; however, membership in the militia offe-
red the young Afro-Cuban military social status. There was little that could have been
more enticing to him: as hinted above, the social class system in the Spanish colonies was
defined primarily by race and was consequently nearly devoid of social class mobility.
Mestizos –mixed-race Amerindian-Europeans– could occasionally pass for criollos, or
colonially-born whites, but pardos and morenos were consigned to second-class status.
However, a parallel, occupationally-defined caste system existed, in which the military
occupied one of the highest levels. In particular, soldiers enjoyed the fuero militar, a cor-
porate privilege that guaranteed them trial in courts-martial, which tended to be more
lenient than civilian proceedings, and which could save the black soldier from a preju-
diced civilian judge.19
But the benefits did not end there, and could be more dramatic still: Antonio Flores,
who in 1708 enlisted in the Cuban militia as a common soldier, became battalion com-
mander after thirty years of service. With this position came the trappings of aristocracy
–he was now Antonio de Flores– and, though himself originally an artisan, Flores was
able to send his son to university and demand the latter’s exemption from any color-re-
lated professional discrimination. Given the Cuban Negro Militia’s unusually large offi-
cer population,20 ambitious enlistees could reasonably aspire to such careers. And while
Flores served for three decades, so lengthy a commitment was not required for the ac-
crual of some benefits –all members of the Cuban Negro Militia enjoyed the fuero and
military social status.21
Spanish recruiters had baited their hooks well. Throughout the 1600s and 1700s,
there was a marked increase in the size of the black militia, rising from a mere 400 sol-
diers in 1586 to a total in 1770 of 3,000 men out of a total of 11,667 soldiers in Cuba.
This was in part due to an expansion of the militia’s size –following Havana’s capture
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18. Klein, 18-19; for mention of a parallel case, see Landers, 202-203.
19. Landers, 202-203; Klein, 18; Kuethe, «The Status of the Free Pardo», 105-110; for fuero militar, see
Lyle N. MacAlister The «Fuero Militar» in New Spain, 1764-1800, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1957).
20. Klein, 19, 25-26; Klein reveals that, according to the 1770 census in Cuba, «for the three battalions
[sic] and 16 companies that existed in Cuba in that year, there were something like 130 colored officers, a not
inconsiderable number when it is remembered that there were only 15,000 free colored males in the total po-
pulation». It should be kept in mind, however, that these are eighteenth-century figures, dating several deca-
des before the militia’s posting to Florida.
21. In 1812, militiaman José Daván was promised no more than 4-5 months’ duty in Florida; José Daván
to José Coppinger, Jan. 19, 1819, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY; Klein, 27.
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by the English in 1762–, Inspector General Alejandro O’Reilly created three full batta-
lions of pardos and morenos, each 800 men strong, as part of a general expansion of
the Cuban militia taking place under the aegis of the Bourbon reforms. But a volunteer
force requires volunteers, and it was the lure of the fuero militar, combined with the
Spanish government’s long tradition of promoting black militiamen’s status in the ge-
neral community and calling for their fair treatment that convinced many militiamen to
join up.22
Of course, these militiamen received these privileges at a price. The Cuban Negro
Militia saw military action often, and not always in Cuba: in 1767, General O’Reilly led
a force that included 160 volunteer black militiamen to take Louisiana from the French,
while up into the early nineteenth century, CNM soldiers regularly found themselves
posted to Mexico. Our previous example of a CNM militiaman, Antonio de Flores, pro-
ves revealing: during his three decades of duty, Flores fought against three ships (one
British, two French), fought pirates and had participated in an expedition to West Flo-
rida where he was captured by the French.23
This was the soldier who arrived in Florida: a seasoned professional member of a mi-
litia with a bicentennial tradition of service and an equally entrenched tradition of acti-
ve duty in combat situations. But, this was also a soldier whose motivations were not ne-
cessarily patriotic or altruistic; rather, many of these soldiers enlisted for the benefits
militia service provided them, and in all probability considered this service –and the ha-
zardous duty it sometimes entailed– the price they paid in return.
Meanwhile, by the nineteenth century, Florida had already proved itself a difficult
province to hold, and not just for Spain. Between 1760 and 1790, East and West Florida
had passed through British and French hands before returning to Spain in 1783. And,
from the turn of the century on, the Spanish government in both Floridas had to con-
tend with the newly minted United States’ increasingly evident territorial ambitions. The
watershed came in 1810, as an American uprising in Baton Rouge touched off a three-
year diplomatic and military conflict that ended with West Florida’s annexation by the
United States in 1813.24 The following year it was East Florida’s turn: mounting tensions
with Great Britain provided the United States with a potential excuse to annex the pro-
vince, and prompted a secret Congressional resolution that provided for this possibi-
lity.25 President James Madison appointed two commissioners charged with enforcing
this resolution. Shortly thereafter, Commissioner George Mathews successfully provo-
25Illes Imperis  -  12
Alejandro J. Gómez del Moral
22. Landers, 203; Kuethe, Cuba, 1753-1815, 106-107, 109-110.
23. Klein, 19-20.
24. Hoffman, 261; Rembert W. Patrick, Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border
1810-1815, (Athens: University of Georgia, 1954), 32-39; for more information, see Fuller, 146-181.
25. Rufus Kay Wyllys, «The East Florida Revolution of 1812-1814», The Hispanic American Historical
Review 9:4 (Nov., 1929), 419-424; This resolution, quoted on page 420, declared that, «the United
States….cannot without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign
power [meaning Britain…. a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide….for the temporary oc-
cupation of the said territory….subject to future negotiation»; the final clause of this resolution is suggestive
of an underlying annexationist motivation.
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ked a rebellion along the Georgia-Florida frontier, aided by several American gunboats
and a detachment of American troops, since referred to as the ‘Patriot War’.26
The Patriot War began in mid-March 1812, and from the very beginning went badly
for the Spanish. Mathews’ patriots captured Fernandina bloodlessly, and, emboldened
by this easy victory, continued on to the capital, laying siege to St. Augustine on the
twenty-fifth. Their territory overrun by a foreign invader seemingly backed by the Uni-
ted States government, Spanish Floridian authorities were increasingly alarmed: in June,
newly appointed Governor Kindelán requested reinforcements immediately upon arri-
ving to the colony to assume his post. These, arriving in mid-1812, consisted of three
companies of the CNM.27
The Cuban Negro Militia arrived in Florida to fight a war, and many of the 270 mi-
litiamen likely saw this duty as part of the price they paid for their privileges. Many
might have mistakenly believed –as soldier José Daván did when he arrived a few
months later– that they would only be there a few months. But this price would prove
much higher than they had anticipated, leaving these militiamen disillusioned. The Pa-
triot War would not end for another two years. By December, their commander would
complain to the governor that they lacked adequate sleeping quarters and cooking sup-
plies. And soon enough too they would lack food to cook. In response, many of these de-
moralized soldiers chose to desert, fleeing from the garrison and the military service they
no longer felt properly recompensed for shouldering. Contemporary desertion records
reveal this disillusionment, the pace at which it set in, and what triggered –or more im-
portantly, what did not trigger– it; it is to these records and their analysis that this study
now turns.
Desertion: A Pernicious Trend
Early each month, every military commander in East Florida conducted an inspection of
his men, recording each soldier’s name, hospitalizations, imprisonments, the total com-
pany strength, and, of course, desertions. Examining these records, we discover that, at le-
ast initially, Spanish East Florida was for the Cuban militia just another foreign posting,
like Mexico. Two-thirds of the detachment’s total complement arrived in East Florida on
18 June 1812.28 They were reinforcements sent to help repel an invasion from Georgia,
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26. Wyllyw; see also Patrick, chapters 3-4, and James G. Cusick, The Other War of 1812: The Patriot War
and the American Invasion of Spanish Florida, (Gainesville: University of Florida, 2003), 56-58.
27. Wyllys, 424, 426; Cusick, XV; Landers, 220-221; see also Patrick, chapter 7.
28. Wyllys, 424, 426; it is important to note that Kindelán requested and received reinforcements from
Havana because the Cuban Governor and Captain-General was his superior. Because of both Floridian colo-
nies’ and Spanish Louisiana’s low populations, all three of these territories were made part of a larger Captain-
Generalcy of Cuba, Florida and Louisiana as of the Floridas’ 1783 reacquisition. East and West Florida had
their own governors –Kindelán was one– but these ultimately reported to and received their primary military,
financial and administrative support from Havana. See Duvon C. Corbitt, «The Administrative System in the
Floridas, 1781-1821», Tequesta 1:2 (Aug., 1942), 41-62.
REV.ILLES I IMPERIS-12 (3g)3  27/7/09  08:02  Página 26
now known as the Patriot War, that was led by ex-Georgia Governor George Mathews.29
Between the June arrival of the two companies and year’s end, no desertions are on record.
Unfortunately for the Cuban militia’s legacy, this honeymoon period was short. Let-
ters exchanged between commanders on the St. John’s and St. Mary’s Rivers and Go-
vernor Kindelán reveal that a few months before, in May 1813, the black militia compa-
nies –now three, with the arrival of a company of pardos in April– began losing soldiers.30
From 1813 through the final month of the war –April 1814– 16 desertions took place, or
about one for every month. 1813 saw 13 of these, while three soldiers deserted during
the first four months of 1814.31
Over the next year and a half –through year’s end, 1815– desertions levels remained
close to this unfortunate, but still low rate. The remaining eight months of 1814 brought
six more desertions for a yearly total of nine, and 1815 brought only eight, the lowest
number since the garrison’s black militiamen began deserting in January 1813. Less than
one man in twenty deserted.32 So far, then, the East Florida detachment appears to have
behaved as a typical nineteenth-century troop, with desertions representing a low but
steady drain on its strength.
As 1815 passed into 1816, though, this period of relative tranquility also ended, as
desertions became an increasingly serious problem. In 1816, the first company of more-
nos lost ten percent of its men to desertion. The pardos and second morenos lost even
more, over 12 and 13 percent of their men, respectively. More than one man in ten fled
from the militia detachment during its fourth year in Florida.33 1817 brought an all –too-
brief respite, but by the following year, the militia’s desertion problem was not only
back, but worse than ever– this was the peak period of Cuban Negro Militia desertion in
East Florida. In 1818, the first company of morenos saw its desertions reach an alarming
37 percent of its total troop strength. More than one in three soldiers deserted, and in
September, 13 deserted at once. And these figures pale in comparison with the hemorr-
hage of personnel the company of pardos faced: here, desertions rose from an unremar-
kable three percent to 59 percent, or nearly two desertions for every three men. This was
not only the highest rate of desertion to date, but remained unequaled throughout the
rest of the militia’s time in East Florida.34
From this high point, the militia’s desertion levels tapered downward as the date of
the militia’s departure approached. For the company of pardos, flight from military ser-
vice initially remained a serious, if slightly diminished problem. In 1820, the pardos lost
46 percent of its complement to desertion, nearly half the company. Only in 1821 did
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29. Wyllys; see also Patrick, Chapters 3-4, and Cusick, 56-58.
30. Particularly rich is the correspondence between Governors Kindelán and Coppinger, and Lieutenant
Justo López and Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel.) Tomás Llorente, contained in section 32, reels 60-63 of
the East Florida Papers.
31. Monthly Inspection Lists for Cuban Negro Militia, 1813-1814, section 20, reel 35, EFP, PKY.
32. Monthly Inspection Lists for Cuban Negro Militia, 1815, section 20, reel 35, EFP, PKY.
33. Monthly Inspection Lists for Cuban Negro Militia, 1816, section 20, reel 35, EFP, PKY.
34. Monthly Inspection List for Company of Pardos of Havana, 1818, section 20, reel 36, EFP, PKY.
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this trend finally abate, when the company’s desertions dropped to a mere six percent.
The morenos companies, on the other hand, experienced an immediate return to the low
rates of the Patriot War era, punctuated by sporadic spikes in desertion.35
Flight from the Cuban Negro Militia detachment, then, can be graphed along a rough
bell curve: initially low between 1812 and 1815, desertions rose in 1816, peaked in 1818,
and then gradually declined to Patriot War levels in 1819-1821. So, it seems that Llorente
and Kindelán may have been at least partly right, and the militia was indeed, for at least part
of its tenure in Florida, remarkably unreliable. But the question remains: are these figures
still remarkable when compared to rates among other corps in the Spanish Caribbean?
The answer to this question, unfortunately for the militia, is yes. Once again, there is
damning evidence: Christon Archer, to give one example, places the total combined de-
sertion figures for the Regiments of the Crown and New Spain (both Mexican regiments)
circa 1800 at 1,558 soldiers, well more than each regiment’s official enlistment of 1,350.36
Admittedly, this sounds as bad as any of the black Cuban militia’s numbers. However, it
represents a combined rate of loss of 57.7 percent, while during its nine-year tenure in
East Florida, by contrast –with much of this desertion concentrated into only a few years–
the Cuban militia yielded 180 instances of desertion, out of a combined original strength
of 270. This is a rate of 66.7 percent. Had Archer’s Mexican regiments shown these levels
of flight, their combined figure would be not 1,558 desertions, but 1,798.
The fairer comparison, of course, is with the Cuban militia detachment immediate
colleagues –their white counterparts in the Spanish garrison. Placed under scrutiny, the-
se soldiers reveal that, despite the formidable size of the preceding figures, the Cuban
Negro Militia was alone neither in its desertion nor even necessarily in the scope of this
dereliction of duty.
While there exist only a few documented cases, desertions did occur within at least
two of the three elite (and much smaller) military detachments in East Florida. In a let-
ter dated 14 October 1814, for example, Joaquin Navarro, commander of East Florida’s
gunboats, wrote Governor Kindelán concerning the debts incurred by artillery deserter
José Fernández. According to Navarro, artilleryman Fernández had «by his deser-
tion….contracted several debts from orders that were placed [for/by him]», debts Na-
varro proposed to pay off by selling Fernández’s abandoned effects.37 Four other cases
of desertion from the artillery detachment are also documented –the cases of José Ote-
ro, Marcos Manusi, Pablo Biera and José Claro de Flores.38 Although five cases between
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35. The first company lost a mere four percent to desertion in 1819, for example, while in 1820, a now-
consolidated single morenos company experienced 19 percent desertion, before dropping to one percent in
1821. See Monthly Inspection List for Cuban Negro Militia, 1818, section 20, reel 36, EFP, PKY.
36. Christon Archer, The Army in Bourbon Mexico, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1977), 269-271.
37. Joaquín Navarro to Governor of Florida, 10 Oct. 1814, section 40, reel 75, EFP, PKY.
38. Tomás Llorente to Governor of Florida, 21 Sept. 1813, section 32, reel 62, EFP, PKY; Governor of
Florida to Ygnacio Salens, 2 March 1816, section 38, reel 72, EFP, PKY; Governor of Florida to Ygnacio Sa-
lens, 3 Dec. 1818, section 38, reel 72, EFP, PKY; and Governor of Florida to Ygnacio Salens, 26 Jan. 1813, sec-
tion 38, reel 72, EFP, PKY.
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1783 and 1821 seem few, it should be kept in mind that the artillery commander gene-
rally only led 20-30 soldiers, making the loss of even one man significant.39
The dragoons, perforce an elite corps due to the cost of their horses’ maintenance,
unsurprisingly also produced few deserters, but did have some. Dragón José Martínez,
an accused deserter, was apprehended in early December 1801 and escorted to St. Au-
gustine to await court-martial. Dragoon commander Benito de Pangua’s 16 December
missive discussing Martínez’s case shows that his crime was doubly serious: not only did
he desert, but he abandoned his post as he fled.40 And almost seventeen years later, on 1
June 1818, dragoon Juan Portela also fled service.41
Finally, the bulk of East Florida’s white desertions came from the ranks of the Third
Battalion of Cuba, the centerpiece of the garrison, which served in East Florida betwe-
en 1789 and its disbandment in 1815. It was, according to Sherry Johnson, «[composed
of] the dregs of Spanish and Cuban society and included deserters, vagrants, thieves,
and criminals».42 As one might expect, given this description, many of these soldiers de-
serted over the quarter century their unit spent in East Florida. According to Juan Mar-
chena Fernández, who has tallied the size of the Third Battalion at four points in the Se-
cond Spanish Period, its decline progressed thusly:
TABLE 2.1. Third Battalion of Cuba Troop Size43
Year Battalion Size Year Battalion Size
1790 371 men 1790 371 men
1800 253 1800 253
1810 256 1810 256
1814 187 1814 187
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39. See, for example, Monthly Inspection List, Artillery Detachment, 8 Feb. 1798, section 20, reel 32,
EFP, PKY; and Marchena Fernández, «Guarniciones y población militar», 103. In October 1797 and January
1798, the company lost two men to illness. This alone represented an 8 percent loss.
40. Governor of Florida to Benito de Pangua, 15 Dec. 1814, section 35, reel 67, EFP, PKY; Benito de
Pangua to Governor of Florida, 16 Dec. 1814, section 35, reel 67, EFP, PKY; the distinction between deser-
tion and abandonment of post may seem a fine one, but it was not. Anselmo Gamboa, for example (see foot-
note 84), left his guard station to look in on a party, fully intending to return afterwards. José Maldonado, on
the other hand (see note 86), was clearly guilty of a far more permanent sort of flight. For differentiation even
between different severities of desertion, keyed to number of instances, see note 83.
41. We know of Portela’s desertion both through the inspection that Alferez and brevet Lieutenant Juan
Percheman of the Dragoons conducted of his detachment on 2 July 1818, which noted Portela as missing sin-
ce the night before, and from a letter from Governor Coppinger to Percheman, dated 22 June 1819, in which
the governor addressed Percheman’s request that the deserted dragoon’s wages be remitted to Percheman’s
troop despite his long absence. Monthly Inspection List for Dragoon Detachment, 2 July 1818, section 20, reel
36, EFP, PKY; José Coppinger to Juan Percheman, 22 June 1819, section 35, reel 69, EFP, PKY.
42. Sherry Johnson, «The Spanish St. Augustine Community, 1784-1795: A Reevaluation,» Florida His-
torical Quarterly 68:1 (July, 1989), 39.
43. Marchena Fernández, «Guarniciones y Población Militar», 104; optimum size for this battalion was
378 men; see Marchena Fernández, «Guarniciones y Población Militar», 103.
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This represents a roughly 49.6 percent drop in size between 1790 and 1814; over the
course of its tenure in East Florida, the Third Battalion lost nearly half of its men.
Estevan Protomartir was among those who deserted, as were Prudencio Sosa, Wen-
cislado Romero and Antonio Ada Martínez, all soldiers of the third and fourth compa-
nies of the Third Battalion. On 21 April 1814, Captain Llorente wrote Governor Kinde-
lán from San Nicolás to report that these soldiers had gone missing the night of the
sixteenth and, having stolen a canoe, had crossed the St. John’s River:
On the night of the sixteenth, the following soldiers were missing from the muster: Estevan
Protomartir, Prudencio Sosa, and from the gunboat Zelosa Wencislado Romero and Antonio
Ada Martínez, who were still missing the following morning; I therefore dispatched a party un-
der Corporal Vila to track them…when it arrived at the plantation of M. Ploma, the party was
told that they [the deserters] had taken their canoe and passed to the other side [of the river]…
This same letter also documented second company soldier José Canas’ desertion the
next night. The following November, Kindelán received another such report from Llo-
rente, informing him that José Palma of the Third Battalion and serving aboard the gun-
boat Zelosa, along with a pardo militiaman from the Ynmutable, had fled his post on the
sixteenth. Less than half a year later, in March 1815, the Zelosa lost still more Third Bat-
talion soldiers from its crew. And these are all within roughly one year of each other
–many more cases may be found in the decades predating the Cuban Negro Militia’s
arrival. In August and September 1799, for example, seven Third Battalion soldiers de-
serted, including a corporal in the prestigious grenadier company.44 Marchena Fernán-
dez’s 49.6 percent drop is not necessarily or even likely exactly equal to the Third Batta-
lion’s total rate of desertion. Deserters could and did return on occasion, and not all
deserters successfully got away. The true percentage of the Third Battalion that deserted
could thus have been considerably higher than the 49.6 percent figure, which accounts
for neither eventuality nor repeat offenders. On the other hand, Marchena Fernández
himself admits that his numbers represent absolute losses, with no distinctions drawn
between decreases caused by death, discharges from the military or flight from service,
meaning that the Third Battalion’s actual number of desertions could also be conside-
rably lower.45
Direct, quantitative comparison of desertions within the Third Battalion of Cuba
and the Cuban Negro Militia, must thus be left aside. Still, what is certain is that the
Third Battalion experienced extensive desertion from within its ranks. As many as (and
perhaps even more than) 42 men deserted in 1813-1814, approximately one in four of
the soldiers serving in January 1813.46 If something was the matter with the Cuban mili-
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44. Monthly Inspection List for Third Battalion of Cuba, 9 Aug. and 7 Sept. 1799, section 20, reel 32,
EFP, PKY.
45. Marchena Fernández, «Guarniciones y Población Militar,» 105; note that by licensure, what is meant
is ‘licenciamiento’, the granted of a ‘licencia’ or discharge from the Spanish military.
46. Monthly Inspection Lists for Third Battalion of Cuba, 1813-1814, section 20, reel 34, EFP, PKY.
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tia, so too was there a serious problem brewing within the ranks of its white companion
in the garrison.
Disease and Dearth in the Garrison
The first and most readily discernible explanation lies in the conditions that soldiers en-
dured while serving in the garrison. Service in early nineteenth-century East Florida me-
ant living with the constant threat of contagion. Within half a year of their arrival, five
men from the morenos companies were already ill, the first three of these within two
months. This was not merely a ‘seasoning’ period, during which soldiers fell ill, recove-
red, and served healthfully thereafter; disease remained a problem for the duration of the
Patriot War, and afflicted even Florida’s veterans. By the end of the war, 17 men had mis-
sed inspection due to illness or hospitalization (or both), including two officers, Lieute-
nant José Maria Acosta and Sub-lieutenant Ignacio Pastor. One of the soldiers, Francisco
de Castro, had died.47 The years immediately following the war brought only higher levels
of illness, with 11 pardos soldiers sick in November 1814 –and this in a company of 90
men– while in Spain’s last years on the peninsula a lower but still formidable one-to-two
solders were ill on average per month.48 Malaria, yellow fever, dysentery, leprosy and go-
norrhea are all diseases of which there are documented cases; malaria and dysentery in
particular ravaged the garrison, while yellow fever was so feared that a decade before, in
1804, all commerce with South Georgia had briefly been severed based on the rumor that
the settlement of St. Mary’s, Georgia had experienced an outbreak.49
Soldiers faced additional hardships beyond these immunological dangers. Severe
shortages of even the most basic staples of military service were similarly widespread and
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47. Monthly Inspection Lists for Cuban Negro Militia detachment, 1812-1814, section 20, reel 35, EFP,
PKY.
48. Monthly Inspection Lists for Company of Pardos, 7 Nov. 1814, section 20, reel 35, EFP, PKY;
Monthly Inspection Lists for Cuban Negro Militia detachment, 1817-1821, section 20, reel 36, EFP, PKY.
49. Bernard Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida, (Gainesville, Fla: University of
Florida Press, 1962); for location of fevers, see Romans, 230-231; for description of symptoms, see Romans,
234-239; for description of malaria symptoms, see Darrett B. Rutman and Anita H. Rutman, «Of Agues and
Fevers: Malaria in the Early Chesapeake,» The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., 33:1 (Jan., 1976), 33-34.
The first medical cases among the Cuban Negro Militia likely involved malaria. Francisco de Castro, Francis-
co de la Luz, and Dionicio Palomino were reported sick at their company’s August inspection, and again in
October, but not at the inspection on 5 September. They must have fallen ill at some point in mid-summer, and
improved in late August or early September, only to fall ill again later that month. This pattern suggests Ro-
mans’ intermittent fever, as does the time frame, which is consistent with both Romans’ description of inter-
mittent fevers, and with annual malaria patterns in the early Chesapeake. In Castro’s case, we can even con-
jecture as to what type of intermittent –or rather, malaria– he contracted. Castro died little more than a week
after being reported sick in October, suggesting the more lethal plasmodium falciparum strain of malaria, and,
based on the criteria established by Rutman and Rutman, the date of the illness and race of the patient (ac-
cording to them, black men, even if resistant to the less lethal vivax strain, were not so to falciparum) also re-
commend it. See Monthly Inspection List for First Company of Morenos, 5 Sept. 1814 and Oct. 1814, section
20, reel 35, EFP, PKY.
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served as another powerful incentive for the Cuban militia’s soldiers to desert. Almost
immediately following their disembarkation in St. Augustine, the militiamen were forced
to do without. Pay was scarce, rations were often delayed or cut, shoddily constructed
weapons were either already broken when issued or soon rusted and molded into use-
lessness, and rarely-replaced uniforms were reduced to little more than rags from ove-
ruse, leaving the Cubans –used to the tropical climate of their home island– shivering in
the cold rains of North Florida’s winters and unprotected in the summers from the pe-
ninsula’s ubiquitous malaria-bearing mosquitoes.
The Cuban militiamen first encountered this supply shortfall only four months after
arriving, on 19 October 1812. Joséf María Guerra, commander of the second morenos
company, requested a number of necessary mess items, the most important of which was
a pot capable of cooking for eighty men. It took nearly five months and two letters from
militia commander Manuel de Castilla to presumably acquire the pot –presumably, be-
cause whether Castilla eventually met with success remains a mystery, as no extant do-
cument confirms the pot’s receipt. We have only his subsequent silence on the matter as
evidence.50
Rations were inhumanly scarce: between 1813 and 1819, Captain Llorente alone is-
sued eleven ration-related complaints. On 24 September 1814, for example, Llorente
wrote Governor Kindelán to report that his troops had not had their meat ration for se-
veral days, and that because of this, they had not been able to prepare their daily com-
munal meals, «for with rice, water and salt, you [the governor] may consider how they
would turn out, more so when the rice is of poor quality». And on 12 September, when
Llorente’s men had meat, they had lacked the salt ration they needed to preserve it.51
Similarly, money for pay and supplies was so scarce in 1818 that militia Lieutenant
Pablo Rosete was forced to take on loans to pay his soldiers’ wages and expenses, rui-
ning his personal credit in the process.52 A letter to Governor Kindelán, dated 12 No-
vember 1813, provides what may be the best single description of what the realities of
service were for the Cuban Negro Militia in East Florida:
Amid the conflict in which I find myself at this post, I am obligated to manifest to Your Ho-
nor my situation: my troop is extremely tired, with 20 days of continuous vigilance, as I pre-
dicted what was to happen. Various [soldiers are] rather sick, my armory grows thin, lacking
enough munitions to resist [even] two more attacks. The gunboat Havanera [has] only two
shots of its caliber, lacks a crew complement, and thus, is another burden for the troop. [We
also lack] a doctor who can cure these poor men, and the inhumanity that is seeing them die
for lack of any aid…it has been six days that they have not consumed anything other than
meat and water, unable to find anything else and lacking anything with which to buy [what
they might find]. This means that if these bastards do not retire, the time will come when the-
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50. Inventory written by Joséf María Guerra, 19 Oct. 1812, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY; Manuel de
Castilla to Governor of Florida, 31 Oct. 1812 and 9 March 1812, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY.
51. Tomás Llorente to Governor of Florida, 24 Sept. and 12 Sept. 1814, section 32, reel 62, EFP, PKY.
52. Pablo Rosete to Governor of Florida, 9 March 1818, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY.
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re is not a single soldier who can stand duty, and they will sicken. The fresh meat, I believe, is
about to run out, because the rebels are on this side [of the river] unchallenged, and in sum
everything is extremely scarce.
Llorente’s men were exhausted, overused, sick and growing sicker, had no doctor,
had already run out of every type of ration except meat and water, and were about to run
out of fresh meat as well. And even if they were still willing to fight, they were also about
to use the last of their ammunition. The link between these privations and militia deser-
tion, meanwhile, is explicit: militia commanders including Llorente and Lieutenant Jus-
to López repeatedly wrote their governor blaming their men’s desertions on the fact that
they were «naked», and «barefoot», lacking a «little tobacco and aguardiente to comfort
them», calling them «infelices» or «poor devils».53
In these plights, at least, East Florida’s black Cuban troops were not alone, for their
white counterparts suffered much the same. As the Patriot War engulfed East Florida,
commanders struggled to adequately uniform the Third Battalion. On 20 October 1814,
Lieutenant Justo López wrote Governor Kindelán stating that
Since the seventeenth of March 1812, this body [the Third Battalion], which took up arms to
defend the Province from the insurrection of the rebels supported by troops and ships from
the United States, and which is still constantly on duty without relief…has not been given any
other clothes but the blanket those in St. Augustine have received and a winter cloak.54
Rations were short within the Third Battalion, just as among the soldiers of the Cu-
ban militia. Lack of rations had been a recurring problem and a cause of poor morale
since at least 1794, and was so through to the even of the Patriot War, with six letters
written specifically on this subject between 14 October of that year and August 1811,
and 231 on the general subject of rations, with specific topics including reductions, da-
mage to bread rations, as well as ration deliveries. One of these, dated 13 April 1805 and
penned by the Cuban Captain-General himself, the Marqués de Someruelos, made ex-
plicit the link between lack of funds, ration shortages and garrison discontent:
This disgust is caused not only by their [the soldiers’] prohibition from personal work [out-
side work undertaken to earn extra money], to which they resort to sustain their families, but
also by their not having been given food [haveres] which have not been obtained due to the
scarcity of capital in the Royal Coffers.55
Despite the end of the Patriot War, ration pressures did not let up, for while the 17
years between October 1794 and August 1811 produced 231 references to and com-
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53. Tomás Llorente to Governor of Florida, 19 Aug. 1813, section 32, reel 61, EFP, PKY; Tomás Lloren-
te to Governor of Florida, 12 Aug. 1813, section 32, reel 61, EFP, PKY.
54. Justo López to Governor of Florida, 20 Oct. 1814, section 36, reel 70, EFP, PKY.
55. Marques de Someruelos to Anonymous, 13 April 1805, section 36, reel 70, EFP, PKY.
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plaints about rations, the period between August 1811 and annexation yielded almost as
many in nearly half the time, 196 references in ten years.
Arms too grew scarce. Arms shortages had long been a concern: from as early as
1806, officers had pondered methods to prevent deserters from taking their weapons
with them into the United States and to retrieve arms that had already crossed the St.
Mary’s.56 In a letter dated 5 August 1811, we find the first evidence of an urgent need for
new arms: here, then-commander of Fernandina Colonel Justo López wrote Interim
Governor Estrada requesting weapons in order to quash the border unrest that Mat-
hews’ agitating had fomented. Ten months later, and two days after the beginning of the
Patriot War, Estrada himself sent a request to the Cuban Captain-General, the ultimate
colonial authority on Floridian matters, requesting not only arms, but food and troops
with which to respond to the Patriots’ advance. And only nine days after that, on 26
March, he sent still another letter, this time requesting troops, an Auditor de Guerra, an
engineer, more troops and arms.57 These shortages were never truly resolved: as late as
the summer of 1817, just before the crucial loss of Fernandina and San Nicolás, general
arms shortfalls were still being reported.58
Perhaps the least popular shortage among East Florida’s white soldiers was a chro-
nic lack of pay. Pay shortage was already a long-standing problem by the Cuban militia’s
arrival: as early as 1790, Governor Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada complained to Luis
de las Casas that troops were discontented due to lack of pay.59 In June 1792, Quesada
communicated to the Conde de Revillagigedo, then-viceroy of New Spain, that he feared
«unpleasant consequences» might result from the fact that his soldiers had not received
any pay.60 The following year, Quesada restated his concerns with considerably more
alarm. In another letter to Revillagigedo, the governor described how troops in East Flo-
rida were at the point of mutiny from the pay shortage they had endured:
With much sorrow I find myself obligated to inform Your Excellency that the fears I mani-
fested in my missive of 20 July last concerning the bad consequences that could be expected
from the delay in pay experienced by the detachment from the Third Battalion of Cuba that
garrisons this post [have come to pass]: the night of the twelfth present, at around 7:30, I was
informed by the sergeant guarding the bivouac beside the church that 11 soldiers of this bat-
talion had sequestered themselves there. As the Royal House in which I live is close by, and
anxious to know the motive of this attempt [at rebellion], I summoned their commander to
inquire [it] of him, and he told me that he had understood from the barricaded soldiers that
it was because they had not been paid their wages. I had Don Bartolomé Morales, Comman-
34 Illes Imperis  -  12
Florida Fallen: The Cuban Negro Militia and the Loss of Spanish East Florida
56. Fernando de la Puente to Governor, 19 Dec. 1806, section 33, reel 63, EFP, PKY; James Seagrove to
Enrique White, 12 Jan. 1807, section 33, reel 63, EFP, PKY; Fernando de la Puente to Governor, 28 Mar. 1807,
section 33, reel 63, EFP, PKY; Manuel Romero to Enrique White, 24 Aug. 1810, section 32, reel 60, EFP, PKY.
57. Justo López to Juan José de Estrada, 5 Aug. 1811, section 32, reel 61, EFP, PKY; Juan José de Estra-
da to Marques de Someruelos, 17 March and 26 March 1812, section 2, reel 17, EFP, PKY.
58. Juan Percheman to Governor, 28 July 1917, section 35, reel 68, EFP, PKY.
59. Juan Nepomuceno de Quesada to Luis de las Casas, 2 Nov. 1790, section 2, reel 8, EFP, PKY.
60. Governor of Florida to Conde de Revillagigedo, 20 July 1792, section 21, reel 36, EFP, PKY.
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der of the Battalion immediately informed and coming to my memory what took place in Pa-
nama with the three companies of the Battalion of the Queen and the rest of that post’s garri-
son, which Your Excellency witnessed in Seville with the Companies of Cordova in Havana
and [in] Cuba with the Lisbon Troop…»
Fortunately, Governor Quesada was able to diffuse the situation by informing the
rebels that, while their identities were presently unknown to him, they would surely be
identified (and, presumably, punished) upon their commander’s arrival. With much ca-
joling, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks in exchange for pardons.61 Notably, this
letter also demonstrates that this near-mutiny was not unique, and neither was its moti-
ve: the incident involving the Battalion (elsewhere referred to as the Regiment) of the
Queen in Panama consisted of two troop uprisings that took place in 1766 and 1767,
both seeking increases in pay and punctuality in its delivery.62
But if the state of soldiers’ pay was bad before the militia landed, conditions were
considerably worse after its arrival. Writing in February 1813, Governor Kindelán pro-
vided Cuban Captain-General Juan Ruiz de Apodaca with a list of 23 individuals who
had deserted, according to Kindelán, partly due to unpaid wages. In May 1814, Kinde-
lán produced another list of deserters –these dating from as far back as 1 January 1814–
and added that the Cuban Negro Militia had been largely ignored by its subinspectors
in Havana.63
Most eloquent of all was Kindelán’s third and last letter to Apodaca regarding pay
shortfalls, dated 16 August 1814. Clearly alarmed, the Governor described the discon-
tent that lack of pay and supplies had bred within the garrison and administration as
«massive», and proposed a solution that betrays the desperation he felt: Kindelán re-
quested that a small schooner be sent directly from Cuba for use in maintaining better
communication between the two posts, and that the schooner be sent «full of supplies».
Leaving no mistake as to how serious he was about this last request, he repeated it –the
schooner was to be full of supplies.64
The Situado, Florida’s Missing Lifeblood
Too few schooners «full of supplies» came to Florida because schooners, to say nothing
of the supplies with which to fill them, required money, and money was something that,
as the Second Spanish Period progressed, became very scarce for Spanish East Florida’s
colonial government. Simply put, the scope and severity of East Florida’s financial co-
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61. Governor to Conde de Revillagigedo, 14 Mar. 1793, section 21, reel 36, EFP, PKY.
62. Juan Marchena Fernández, Oficiales y Soldados en el Ejercito de America, (Seville: Escuela de Estui-
dos Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1983), 367-368.
63. Sebastián Kindelán to Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, 22 Feb. 1813 and 13 May 1814, section 2, reel 12, EFP,
PKY.
64. Sebastián Kindelán to Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, 16 Aug. 1814, section 2, reel 12, EFP, PKY.
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llapse –for it was a collapse– cannot be overstated, and had a decided impact not just on
military spending and garrison desertions, but on the destiny of the entire colony. East
Florida’s financial troubles began early, almost immediately after the reimposition of
Spanish rule. As early as January 1785, East Florida Governor Vicente Manuel de Zés-
pedes received a complaint over lack of government funds, and by March of that same
year, Zéspedes wrote the Conde de Gálvez, then Captain-General of Cuba and soon to
be Viceroy of New Spain, complaining of money shortages that had forced him to with-
draw troops detached to San Nicolás.65 These money troubles were bearable nuisances,
however. There was still sufficient money, for example, for the colonial government to
make deposits into a fund for building parish churches in 1790, to pay military, govern-
ment, ecclesiastical and even schoolteachers’ salaries in 1799, to donate to the poor in
that same year, and even to buy a «large cross» –valued at 38 pesos, far outstripping the
average monthly salary of 7-9 pesos that a common soldier received– for the St. Augus-
tine comestibles warehouse in 1795.66
In February 1808, French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s armies, supposedly
guests passing through Spanish territory on their way to Portugal, turned on their host
country’s garrisons and quickly occupied most of the Iberian Peninsula, igniting the Pe-
ninsular War and ending more than a decade of peace in Spain. For East Florida, the co-
ming of the Peninsular War coincided with and reinforced a marked change in the co-
lony’s finances. From January 1808 through June 1810, opening monthly balances
–which, to reiterate, did not include money in the special funds– rose considerably, re-
maining generally at between 8,000 and 15,000 pesos, by comparison.67 Income and dis-
counting, meanwhile, skyrocketed: from 1808 through late 1810, treasury income rose
steadily, until by October 1810, the reported pre-discount balance at month’s end was
an impressive 35,964 pesos and 6.5 reales, or five times the average ending balance two
years before. And discounts, as the far lower monthly beginning balances reported
might suggest, topped the 10,000 peso mark by October 1809 and kept climbing for
another year until, in December 1810, Florida’s treasurer allocated 22,182 pesos and 5
reales to special funds, with 16,669 pesos of this money going to military accounts, and
12,841 pesos, 7 reales specifically destined for the depósito de subvención de guerra.68
Notably, discounts remained at over 40 percent of their corresponding ending balances
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between June 1808 and December 1811 –the longest and highest sustained stretch of sa-
ving between 1806 and 1821.
To illustrate the relative size of the above figures, June 1792’s ending balance, co-
ming in peacetime and before the conflicts of 1804-1821 leeched Florida’s financial vi-
tality, was lower by more than 9,000 pesos. And the total discount for June 1792 was
12,015 pesos, not quite as much as the subvención de guerra’s discount alone.69 And June
1792 was by no means a poor month. On the other hand, November 1792 posted a post-
discount ending balance of 58,698 pesos, with another 11,798 pesos discounted. 1808-
1810, then, placed St. Augustine on a prosperous footing belonging to an earlier time in
the Second Spanish
By Spain’s final decade in Florida, however, this relative prosperity (and this term is
used advisedly) had come to an end: the St. Augustine Royal Treasury’s balance sheets
for this period reveal that following the military crises of 1810-1814, East Florida’s fi-
nances took a sharp downturn, equally evident under several measures. First, the
amount of liquid funds available in the St. Augustine treasury at the end of each month
decreased by a full order of magnitude; although there was some fluctuation, especially
in 1817, the pool of funds upon which the East Florida government could readily draw
was simply not what it had once been.70 Also, after 1800, the size of the yearly situado (a
subsidy payment rendered by rich, profitable colonies to help support colonies opera-
ting in the red) that St. Augustine received from New Spain through Havana began to
decrease rapidly, according to Lígia María Bermúdez, in response to the ever-decreasing
size of the colony’s garrison, whose salaries and expenses it paid. But in the meantime,
East Florida’s population actually grew, stretching the situado to its limits and forcing
authorities to resort to inadequate and ultimately troublesome loans.71
Militarily, this translated into fewer deposits into and ever-larger withdrawals from
the depósito de subvención de la guerra, the colony’s «fund for the subvention of war».
These funds were then as a rule deposited into an account labeled «Situación» (situa-
tion), the fund that usually contained New Spain’s contribution to Floridian finances.72
It also meant fewer salary payments for the garrison, less money that could be spent on
supplies and rations, and similarly decreased expenditures on maintenance of fortifica-
tions. And more generally, financial instability led to decreased (and eventual cessation
of) government saving, leaving authorities with less money to fall back on during future
crises. For the garrison in particular, and for the colony of East Florida as a whole, this
constituted what is termed here a financial «crunch».
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A simple comparison with figures from 1795, the final year of Florida’s previous war,
and 1799-1800, four years into its aftermath, highlights the extent to which Florida’s fi-
nances after 1811 were an unmitigated failure. In 1795, after two years of war, the colony
showed soaring ending balances of 21,982 pesos (March), 24,848 pesos (August) and
even 66,090 pesos (July), as well as more humble –but by comparison with numbers
from 1811-1821, still respectable– quantities like 5,037 pesos (January) and 8,213
(May).73 The same cannot be said of 1814. In June 1814, St. Augustine found itself with
only 29 pesos in liquid funds available –its lowest opening balance yet.74 And, notably,
this came to pass despite the delivery of 1,032 pesos from Vera Cruz (part of the long-
awaited situado?) and the liquification of 1,673 pesos and 7.5 reales from special funds
like the depósito de subvención.75
The difference between 1799-1800 and 1815-1821 is even more pronounced. In Oc-
tober 1799, the provincial treasury posted an ending balance of 61,288 pesos 5.5 reales,
with an additional 12,120 pesos discounted for funds like the depósito de subvención.
Two months later, at year’s end, the ending balance was 44,065 pesos, with 13,855 set
aside. And though by June 1800 this sum had dropped to 11,583 pesos, the treasury still
held an additional 14,377 pesos and 2.5 reales in abeyance. By comparison, the highest
pre- or post-discount ending balance we can find after 1811 totals to 11,046 pesos (in
November 1814) with no money in discounted funds. In fact, one has to go back to June
1810 to find a quantity comparable to the former years’ figures.76 In sum, the years of
1811-1814 damaged East Florida’s finances severely, reducing the treasury’s assets to a
scale that had no parallel in the colony’s modern history. It is not difficult, however, to
arrive at some notion of why this happened.
The stability and modest growth seen in 1806-1808 are easily explained by re-
course to the figures quoted above, a little knowledge of Spain’s wars, and the fact
that East Florida received a sizable situado, totalling 97,501 pesos. What prosperity
Florida enjoyed in 1806 can probably be credited to the remaining vestiges of 1800’s
riches and the arrival of the situado in 1806, while the low balances and remarkable
stability of the colony’s finances in the face of that situado –a sudden influx of 97,501
pesos can be quite destabilizing– make sense when we consider two points: first, in
the absence of a regular situado, East Florida was run largely on loans against antici-
pated payments, meaning that most of an incoming subsidy payment was already
spent. And second, January 1806 came only two years after the beginning of a new
war in Europe in which Spain was allied with France against Great Britain, one of the
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few European powers with a sufficiently formidable navy to threaten as distant a co-
lony as Florida.77
There are two reasons, meanwhile, for the boom of 1808-1810. First, while Napoleon’s
occupation of Spain hurt the latter’s colonies insofar as transatlantic communication and
financial support was temporarily severed, Florida’s situado came from Puebla, Mexico,
not Madrid.78 And Spain’s subsequent alliance with the English helped Florida conside-
rably –England’s navy was a formidable foe, while France’s strength was in the Emperor’s
Grande Armée (Grand Army), which was hardly likely to brave the Atlantic on a mission
to conquer Florida. And second, as Paul Hoffman points out, East Florida’s «small…com-
mercial boom after 1808…[happened] thanks to use of Amelia Island’s port…to evade the
U.S. Embargo and a general surge in demand for East Florida’s exports».79
Finally, the financial decline of 1811 follows logically from the many pressures to
which Florida’s finances was exposed. The revolt of West Florida coincided with the be-
ginning of this collapse, both taking place in mid 1810. The United States’ decision to
resume exporting cotton to Europe in 1810, coupled with the commercially dampening
effect of a Spanish regulation that required all ships to have consular certificates contri-
buted as well. According to Paul Hoffman, this alone produced a 90 percent decline du-
ring the following two years in cotton imports from the United States and exports to Bri-
tain.80 George Mathews’ efforts in 1811 to instigate a revolt of so-called Patriots were
surely also disruptive, and, from March 1812 on, the Patriot War of 1812-1814 raged, for
much of which a besieged St. Augustine was cut off from the rest of the colony. Given
these obstacles, it is hardly surprising that East Florida’s finances, and thus its military
fortunes, took a turn for the worse.
The Authorities Too Were Guilty
Finally, a considerable amount of blame for desertions and misbehavior must be placed
on the shoulders of the Spanish authorities in East Florida. Officials in East Florida –in-
cluding Coppinger himself– and even the Crown were guilty of having fostered a cultu-
re of military service in East Florida that tolerated desertions, pardoning or lightly pu-
nishing absconders. In this chapter’s introduction, we conjectured that this policy was
conceivably a major impetus to recidivist desertion; here we conclude that it was. Nu-
merous examples of such desertion by soldiers who not only fled a second time, but did
so only shortly after returning from previous absences, support this conclusion.
The case of militiaman Francisco Zerpa, who fled from San Nicolas to St. Augusti-
ne in 1813 citing mistreatment by a Lieutenant Andrés Ayala, serves as an excellent
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example of how permissive garrison authorities could be. After his mid-1813 flight and
capture, Zerpa could not have been long in the stockade, as by early January 1814 he was
on active duty again and posted at Fernandina. The folly of Manuel de Castilla’s merci-
ful decision quickly became apparent. On 3 January, Zerpa deserted again. There is no
record of his capture or voluntary return (the latter of which, as is shown below, could
mitigate or even nullify penalties), but the pardos’ 5 April 1814 inspection marks him as
yet again present and active at Fernandina. Clearly any previous disciplinary action had
not succeeded in putting a halt to Zerpa’s tendency toward flight, because approxima-
tely three months later, Zerpa deserted yet again. At this point, the stiff penalty of ten
years hard labor that desertores reincidentes –recidivist deserters– were supposed to re-
ceive should certainly have been imposed on Zerpa, but it seems he suffered no such
fate. There no record of any subsequent imprisonment, and the pardos’ 10 December
1816 inspection, which notes Zerpa as hospitalized, makes no mention of concomitant
imprisonment, a distinct condition that company commanders noted. And Zerpa was
still not done deserting, for on 21 December 1817, he fled a fourth and final time.81 Were
these additional desertions actively motivated by Castilla’s forbearance? This is difficult
to say –we have no testimony from Zerpa himself. However, it makes sense to say that
Castilla’s treatment of Zerpa sent a message to his soldiers that their commander was le-
nient toward deserters. And it is incontrovertibly true that placing Zerpa back in his
company’s ranks put him in a position from which he could again desert, which he could
not have done if incarcerated or sentenced to hard labor.
Other examples abound. Anselmo Gamboa, a soldier in the first company of more-
nos, abandoned his post in St. Augustine, only to be apprehended by Pablo Rosete him-
self, who found him wrapped in his blanket without rifle or uniform. Despite having
been caught red-handed, Gamboa returned to duty shortly after the end of his trial. Was
this justice? Perhaps: Gamboa, a young man, claimed that he had only intended to leave
for a short while, in order to observe a nearby party through a window.82 But once again
the garrison’s commanders proved willing to let offenses slide, an attitude that cannot
have been lost on their soldiery. To cite another example, deserter Juan Otoñez of the
Third Battalion, who we encountered in Chapter Two, returned to the garrison in Octo-
ber 1813. Commander Ribera reincorporated Otoñez into the ranks, only to have this
lenience backfire, for on 23 October, Ribera was forced to report that soldier Otoñez
had successfully deserted again.83 Had Otoñez been incarcerated, this flight would have
at least been more difficult to accomplish; possibly, the punishment might have stripped
Otoñez of his penchant for flight.
In fact, there is ample evidence indicating that many of these desertions, including
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at least one of Zerpa’s, may have been calculated attempts by the fleeing militiamen to
renegotiate their conditions of service with the East Floridian colonial government, acts
analogous to the practice of petit marronage, and possible only because of a climate of le-
niency that permitted such bargaining to occur. Historian John Thornton defines petit
marronage as the slave practice of running away –marronage, from which the English
term maroon and the Spanish term cimarrón are both derived– and then returning.84 Pe-
tit marronage, Thornton tells us, was a means by which the slave could voice his disple-
asure and remind his master of his worth in money and labor. Pedro Quiroga, for exam-
ple, who according to Thornton was «master founder at the royal copper mines of
Cocorote in Venezuela», ran away continually, though never with the intention of staying
away permanently. Often, in fact, he returned of his own accord. And often too he was
rewarded as a result of these escapades, rather than punished, to which Thornton points
as evidence of some form of negotiation. Petit marronage could also come in the form of
slaves running from one master to another, presumably more pleasant, owner.85
Both of these behaviors may be found in records of the Cuban Negro Militia’s de-
sertions. On 16 July 1813, Manuel de Castilla wrote Governor Sebastián Kindelán to in-
form him of Francisco Zerpa’s first desertion, undertaken with fellow militia member
Lazaro del Castillo, both of whom had fled their assigned detachment stationed at San
Nicolás and rejoined their original company in St. Augustine, having become unwilling
to serve under Lieutenant Andrés Ayala, who, Castilla reported, «threatens them and
mistreats them constantly with ill-advised rigor».86 Simply by replacing the label ‘master’
with ‘commanding officer’, we have here a clear instance of the latter form of petit ma-
rronage. Crossing a much larger expanse of territory, Domingo Obiedo and Andrés Do-
bles, both Cuban pardo militiamen, also appear to have deserted in order to exchange
masters. In May 1819, the pair presented themselves to Negro militia commander Pablo
Rosete, who did not know whether to incorporate them into his troop: they had deser-
ted on the sixteenth of the previous month, but from West Florida, specifically from the
fort of Apalache.87 The desertion of Francisco Zerpa and Lázaro del Castillo, meanwhi-
le, also served the pair in the former sense of petit marronage as well. By deserting di-
rectly to authorities in St. Augustine, and citing Lieutenant Ayala’s mistreatment as their
motive, Zerpa and Castillo used the episode to give voice to a grievance. And, tellingly,
their technique was effective –Governor Kindelán was sufficiently swayed by this com-
plaint that he ordered Lieutenant Justo López to conduct an investigation into Ayala’s
conduct.
Again, though, petit marronage, or even simple cases of second thoughts, could only
flourish in an environment in which deserters were potentially better served by retur-
ning to duty than by remaining absent. Andrés Dobles and Domingo Obiedo’s departu-
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re from San Marcos in 1819, for example, might not have taken place had the soldiers
not expected as warm a welcome, or at least have ended differently, with no end to their
absence from service. Similarly, Third Battalion soldier José Maldonado, possibly the
same deserter who returned from «Rodeisland» in 1804, deserted from Amelia Island on
3 August 1799, and then returned on 7 August expressing regret over having deserted.88
The likelihood is that Maldonado believed even when he deserted that he might receive
some form of clemency, and this can only have made his decision to flee easier. And, if
the case of Juan de Castro’s desertion is any indication, had Maldonado not harbored
this belief he probably would not have been willing to return.
Maldonado and others like him harbored this certainty in part because the lenien-
ce they expected was codified many times during the Second Spanish Period in the
form of royal indulgences or amnesties promulgated by an authority far superior to Ro-
sete, Ribera, Llorente or even the Governor of East Florida –the King himself. The Go-
vernor could be lenient: recall that it was Governor Coppinger, citing troop shortages,
who pardoned Julián Acosta. But King Ferdinand VII opened the door for desertions
wide on 8 November 1817. That day, His Majesty issued a royal indulgence that,
among other measures, lessened penalties for deserters. Wanting to attract fugitives
back to military service, Ferdinand made generous concessions: deserters were not to
be imprisoned –certainly not for the ten years recidivists received previously– but
were to serve a variable term of six, seven or eight years, or their remaining term of
service, whichever was less.89 This service was to be identical to standard military duty,
save for the loss of any chance of promotion or commendation.90 Nor was this the first
or only such indulgence: on 16 January 1789, a Royal Cédula granted amnesty to de-
serters who turned themselves in within three months of its promulgation. On 16 Fe-
bruary 1793, the Crown issued another such decree. Three years later, the King issued
yet another indulgence, this time in celebration of the contracting of peace with France
and the marriage of the infantas, the King’s daughters. On 27 April 1801, the Crown is-
sued another indulgence. In 1805, still another royal amnesty for deserters was declared.
In 1815, Governor Kindelán announced the issuance of another royal amnesty, and in
1816, yet another amnesty was declared to celebrate the return of Ferdinand VII to the
throne.91
It worked. Third Battalion fifer Domingo Calderín returned to the garrison seeking
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amnesty, as did artillery deserter Marcos Manusi.92 Militia soldier Rufino Petro, who had
been enslaved in Charleston after deserting and crossing the St. Mary’s river into the
United States, was able to return in 1820 and received royal amnesty.93 The promise of
reincorporation even lured back Juan Erazo, who had deserted from the Infantry Regi-
ment of Puebla while stationed in Mobile.94 Clearly, there was now little incentive for the
repentant deserter to stay away. But again, this came at a price: there was now equally lit-
tle incentive for would-be deserters to refrain from fleeing in the first place. And thus,
insofar as officers like Pablo Rosete, East Florida’s governors and the Kings of Spain to-
lerated and thereby fomented desertion, they were all complicit in the decline of the ga-
rrison.
Conclusions
East Florida was not conquered by the United States; Spain willingly ceded the provin-
ce because, by 1821, this previously key but now merely expensive bastion was no lon-
ger worth the trouble. At first glance, the province’s problem was one of defense –com-
manders like General Andrew Jackson and Admiral Gregor McGregor led many
invasions into Spanish Florida that the colony’s inadequate garrison was either unable to
repel or expelled only after great and expensive effort. Florida’s forces were, however,
deficient for a reason, which the service records of the Third Battalion of Cuba and es-
pecially the Cuban Negro Militia reveal. As East Florida’s «Second Spanish Period»
drew to a close, its garrison suffered from a severe manpower shortage caused by ende-
mic desertion. Between the militia’s arrival on 18 June 1812 and its return to Cuba in the
summer of 1821, its contingent of moreno soldiers dropped from 180 men organized
into two companies to 72 soldiers in one. St. Augustine’s company of pardo militiamen,
who arrived in 1813, dropped from an initial complement of 90 men to only 20. These
losses were extreme, but were followed closely by the Third Battalion’s: from an initial
enlistment of 378 men, the battalion dropped to only 154 in December 1814. In fact, the
Third Battalion’s losses were so great that, in 1815, the expensive and moreover dys-
functional unit was disbanded.
Traditionally, many have blamed the soldiers themselves for this widespread dere-
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liction of duty. The Third Battalion, as Sherry Johnson, Allan Kuethe and others have
pointed out, contained «a deplorable number of incorrigibles» that Spanish officials had
passed off to the Cuban military at the battalion’s formation, and which Cuban authori-
ties had similarly sent on to Florida.95 Governor Kindelán himself, despite his public
protestations to the contrary in 1813, privately called his Cuban militiamen vice-laden
«convicts», who fled at the first hint of gunfire.96 But correspondence between the go-
vernor and his commanders on the St. John’s and St. Mary’s rivers indicates that neither
the «convicts» of the Cuban militia, nor the Third Battalion’s supposedly «bad quality»
soldiers deserted simply on a whim; rather, they had grievances that were not being ad-
dressed. And moreover, widespread leniency shown to deserters by Florida officials of
all ranks, and even by the King of Spain, removed the few consequences that gave po-
tential deserters pause.
Taking these potential motives into account, the Cubans’ desertions begin to make
sense. 1813’s desertion spike, for example, is unsurprising, if one considers that these
men, who had enlisted seeking better lives for themselves suddenly faced the uniform
shortage about which Justo López, Tomás Llorente, and Pablo Rosete all complained to
the Governor, the first of Llorente’s many times lacking rations, and a pay situation so
bad that a civilian incurred over two thousand pesos of debt helping to pay the soldiers
–perhaps even unsuccessfully. In fact, the faulty firearms these men were issued may
even have eased their consciences: after all, without proper weapons with which to fight,
what else could be expected of them? 
This, it is argued here, constituted what was effectively a new clause on the unoffi-
cial contract these men had made with Spanish colonial authorities and with the Crown
when they enlisted. Traditionally, this agreement had consisted of a simple trade: in ex-
change for years of service –such as the three decades Antonio de Flores served– these
men received the immediate benefit of military social status, uniforms attesting to their
new rank, the right to carry weapons, and, when on active duty, pay. Over the long term,
enlistees could enjoy benefits like Flores’. Service, while naturally dangerous, followed
certain controlled parameters too: the militia had last fought a major engagement abro-
ad in 1767, as part of General O’Reilly’s attempt to take Louisiana. Since then, their du-
ties had consisted of defending the Cuban coast against raiders, and, as mentioned ear-
lier, occasional service –always brief– in New Spain and the Yucatan peninsula.97 A
Cuban Negro militiaman could reasonably expect to live long enough to collect on the
benefits of lengthy service.
But the old system of social mobility through the militia was broken. East Florida
changed the balance of this trade, making the old bargain one no longer worthwhile for
these militiamen: if lucky, a CNM soldier could look forward to unwanted hardship whi-
le serving far longer than expected as part of a garrison that was not likely to go home
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soon; if unlucky, he might fall afoul of a bullet or disease and not live to enjoy the privi-
leges for which he enlisted.98 The Cuban Negro Militia had grown disillusioned. And in
the meantime, yet another motive for desertion emerged –impatience. Militiaman José
Daván’s 19 January 1819 letter to Governor Cienfuegos, the Captain General of Cuba,
testifies eloquently to this: Daván, who claimed to have enlisted «without any other mo-
tive than being moved to give proof of his love of sovereign, and to contribute to the de-
fense of the just cause», complained that he had served faithfully for six years in East
Florida, though he had expected to return home after four to six months. Daván phrased
his request as a matter of justice.99 Daván cannot have been alone in his frustration; what
is more remarkable is that more men in Daván’s position –to say nothing of Daván him-
self– did not desert.
In fact, this may have been what took place after 1818: desertion levels rose abruptly
this year, a year in which an only typical number of soldiers fell ill.100 Hardship may ex-
plain the rise –1818 and 1819 were the bad years for rations– but little else was remar-
kable. The change, this study posits, was rooted in disillusion: with the post-MacGregor
withdrawal of the military from the St. John’s River, and the signing of the Adams-Onís
Treaty on 22 February 1819, which formalized the cession of Florida to the United Sta-
tes, the Afro-Cubans must have been aware or at least have suspected that Florida was a
lost cause. Daván’s impatience and that of similarly-minded fellow militiamen –the sum-
mer of 1819 marked the militia’s seventh year in Florida– can only have contributed to a
growing conviction that the benefits of militia membership were again no longer worth
the trouble of service in Florida. Some escaped through illness, other vented their frus-
tration through disobedience and were subsequently imprisoned, and the very lucky ma-
naged –like Daván– to request leave. For those remaining, the best option was Acos-
ta’s.101
More broadly, the Cuban Negro Militia’s desertions, and East Florida’s manpower
shortage, were both just single facets of a much larger logistical deficiency. Soldiers de-
serted not because of any general distaste for military service –the militia, at least, was
voluntary– but because of the unbearable nature of service in the East Florida garrison,
which routinely went without proper uniforms, functional weapons, even the bare mini-
mum of rations, or any pay whatsoever. These shortfalls in turn resulted from another
shortage, this time financial. Before 1811, the colony’s finances had already been preca-
rious. Beginning in this year, and in large part due to the economic disruptions of the Pa-
triot invasion, the St. Augustine treasury underwent a financial collapse that was nothing
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98. Falling victim, for example, to a rash of dysentery that spread through Fort San Nicolás in 1814; see
Tomás Llorente to Sebastián Kindelán, 6 March 1814, section 32, reel 62, EFP, PKY.
99. José Davan to Captain General of Cuba, 19 Jan. 1819, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY.
100. Monthly Inspection Lists for Cuban Negro Militia, 1818, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY.
101. Governor of Florida to Pablo Rosete, 6 May 1819, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY; this letter contains
Governor Coppinger’s authorization for Davan to return to Havana; another example of a successful leave re-
quest is Juan Simon de Zoto’s, who asked for and received early passage to Havana due to his mother’s illness.
Juan Simon de Zoto to Governor, 18 March 1820, section 39, reel 75, EFP, PKY.
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short of a catastrophe. As early as the 1780s, Florida’s colonial administration had been
hard-pressed to meet its soldiers’ needs; now, this was impossible. Its defenses compro-
mised, it was only a matter of time before Florida was taken forcibly, most likely by the
United States, to whom Spanish East Florida had become economically dependent in its
final years.102 Nor was the loss of the peninsula much to be regretted by this point –East
Florida had never produced financial surpluses, but had instead historically been a drain
on both Old and New Spain’s treasuries. Expediency, if nothing else, dictated Spain’s
withdrawal.
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